Differences With Nazarenes (Redemption in Christ Jesus)

“Redemption in Christ Jesus” was written to refute the Renunicationist Clean Flesh beliefs of the Nazarene fellowship who renounced Christadelphian beliefs on the atonement with Edward Turney. Many of the arguments in this book are applicable to Shield Clean Flesh even though there are differences.

Redemption in Christ Jesus, 1946, W. F. Barling

“1. The Differences Stated”

( a ) The Curse of the Law

Since its inception the Nazarene Fellowship has denounced Christadelphian teaching regarding man’s nature, and the Atonement, as unscriptural. Yet, in certain essential respects, the faith of its members is no different from our own. They believe with us that:

1. God deals with men on the federal principle, or the principle of including all in one.

2. By it men inherit, and are redeemed from, Adamic condemnation.

3. To accomplish the salvation of man the Redeemer had to be identical in physical nature with those whom he came to save.

4. There is an imperative need for baptism into Christ as a symbolic death to sin, as a condition of justification.

With so much in common, where do we differ? It is when the various opinions expressed by Nazarene writers, in their many pamphlets, are collated to form one concise statement of their views on man’s redemption, that the vital differences which separate us are thrown into relief. Their faith may be summarized thus:

1. Adam, receiving his life direct from God, had free possession of it for as long as he obeyed. Corruptible like the animals, he would (regardless of transgression) have eventually ceased to exist, suffering natural death.

2. He was subjected to law. The penalty of disobedience was summary execution (or the experience of natural death in a violent form) on the day of his crime.

3. By transgressing he sold himself, and forfeited his free life, to Sin. If the sentence of execution had been carried into effect, all mankind would have been deprived of any chance of existence at all.

4. God mercifully spared Adam (and thereby all mankind) from such extinction, by subjecting an animal to violent death in his stead. The animal’s death was, however, only a token payment to Sin for the release of Adam’s life from bond, leaving the full price still to be paid.

5. Men, through physical descent from Adam, are born in legal bondage to Sin, inherited from Adam on the federal principle. The death which normally terminates human life is, in no sense, the consequence for his posterity of his offence.

6. Christ, receiving his life direct from God by miraculous begettal, was not so born in legal bondage to Sin, but had free possession of his life, as Adam did before transgression.

7. Retaining this free possession of life through obedience (where Adam lost it through disobedience) Christ, by undergoing crucifixion, forfeited that life violently as a payment to Sin by which Adam was redeemed from legal bondage, and which confirmed the token payment made by the animal in Eden.

8. Having surrendered possession of life in a natural body, Christ, in reward for perfect obedience, resumed life in a spiritual body.

9. By symbolic death with Christ in baptism the believer is redeemed from the legal bondage to Sin which he inherits at birth, and has imputed to him when enlightened, and is consequently in the same relation to God legally, morally and physically, as Adam was prior to rebellion.

It is obviously implicit in this conception of the Atonement that constitutionally Adam was unaffected by his transgression. His nature is said to have become sinful in one sense only, that it ceased to be God’s property and became that of the rival owner, Sin. Indeed, it is a cardinal tenet of this faith that there is nothing in men which makes it impossible for them to be sinless. Moreover, its adherents make five charges of inconsistency or error against our own teaching:

1. If Adam’s transgression rendered all his descendants inevitable sinners, then God’s punishment of sin is made to be unjust and cruel.

2. If, to be an exception to the universal servitude to a sinful nature, Christ was endowed by his divine paternity with strength to master it which is denied to other men, his temptation was a mere pretence.

3. If Christ, by his birth of a human mother, inherited Adamic condemnation, God is represented as effecting the redemption of man by yielding up to Sin what already belonged to Sin, so redeeming man by fraud.

4. If Jesus died to remove a curse of physical death on human nature, God is represented as charging twice for forgiveness, since believers still die from that curse after the Saviour’s death to remove it.

5. If Christ had in any case to die, being under the same physical condemnation as those whom he came to redeem, his death could not have been a sacrifice, or voluntary surrender of life.

The essentially incompatible elements of this conception of the Atonement, and our own, now emerge clearly. With the statements of A representing the Nazarene, and those of B the Christadelphian view, these differences may be tabulated as follows:

1. A. Adam’s sin had no effect on his physical make-up.

1. B. Adam’s sin made him a mortal ( i.e., dying) creature, sinfully inclined.

2. A. Jesus, as a substitute, forfeited his life in Adam’s stead.

2. B. Jesus, as a representative, died to uphold the Edenic sentence of death on human nature, as a basis for the justification of men before God.

3. A. Jesus, as the son of Mary, was identical in nature with all humanity, in order to prove perfect obedience possible by all.

3. B. Jesus, as the son of Mary, was identical in nature with all humanity, in order to share Adamic condemnation with those whom he came to save.

4. A. Jesus, being begotten of God, was free from Adamic condemnation.

4. B. Jesus, being begotten of God, was enabled to conquer sin.

5. A. The term “sin” in Scripture, while signifying literally “the transgression of law”, is also personified to denote almost exclusively the legal overlord into whose bondage Adam sold himself by disobedience.

5. B. The term “sin” in Scripture, while signifying literally “the transgression of law”, is also generally personified to represent the innate sinfulness of human flesh as a consequence of Adam’s disobedience.

These differences of opinion resolve themselves into one fundamental disagreement. For B the term redemption is a beautiful metaphor to describe man’s salvation from sin, but a figure that must not be pressed beyond certain limits imposed by Scripture itself. On the other hand, the very use of such a legal term is regarded by A as proof in itself that Adam’s condemnation was legal only, and that he was acquitted of it by a purely legal device. Sin was the pawnbroker, Adam’s life was the article in bond, God was the purchaser, and the blood of Christ was the price which God paid to make Adam His own possession once again; such for A, was the transaction which redeemed Adam—simple, and purely legal in character. He alleges that Adam, before his fall, because of his corruptible physical constitution, was in need of deliverance from his natural condition; after transgression he was in need of more—he required redemption from legal bondage before he could resume his probation for eternal life which this period of bondage had interrupted. Men, deriving their life from him, are (according to A) born under legal bondage, but incur Adam’s liability to violent death only when, by being enlightened, they come to realize their state of hereditary bondage to Sin. Redemption is then available to them, also by symbolic death in baptism. Thereupon they enter on their period of probation for eternal life, which becomes attainable by works of righteousness. Those not enlightened, not having condemnation imputed to them personally, die as corruptible creatures, and so perish.

By means of his own logic, A is reassured in his wholly legal conception of the Atonement. He argues that, as Adam was redeemed from death, yet later died, unless his decease were a violation of justice he must, when redeemed, have escaped some other death. This, he postulates, must have been legal death, or violent death by execution. From this he reasons that to secure Adam’s redemption from this legal, sudden death, the price of life demanded by Sin had to be paid by someone of whom it was not otherwise required. Observing, next, that Jesus was begotten miraculously, he concludes that the divine paternity of the Redeemer was for this very purpose, that Jesus might come into the world free from Adamic condemnation, and so possessing a free life which he could pay to Sin for the release of the forfeited life of Adam. Yet the fact that Jesus was made of a woman has also its significance for A. He believes that Jesus possessed not merely the same free life as Adam, but also an identical physical constitution, so that through perfect obedience he might retain the right to life which Adam lost by sinning. At the same time, God can hold sinners guilty because one made in all points like unto his brethren proved perfect obedience possible by every man.

This preoccupation with the legal aspect is the key with which A interprets familiar Scriptures in startlingly novel fashion. His treatment of Romans 8: 3 is a good illustration.

The Law was Weak through the Flesh .—This, he alleges, does not assert (as would appear) that the Law was weak because flesh was incapable of obeying it perfectly, but because obedience to the Lw was of no avail or consequence until man’s flesh was first redeemed from legal bondage.

God sent His Own Son in the Likeness of Sinful Flesh .—Christ came in the likeness of sinful flesh, not (says A) in the sense that his flesh was different constitutionally from that of sinners, but because, due to his divine begettal, it was not Sin’s property but God’s, and therefore not sinful (as A understands the term sinful when applied to the flesh).

God condemned Sin in the Flesh .—Correctly understood, says A, this statement signifies that in the person of Jesus sin was condemned as a wrong thing to have committed, and that “sin in the flesh” in which B believes is something that does not exist in fact.

It can thus be seen that Scriptures which for B establish the sinfulness of human flesh as a fact, are used by A to prove it a fallacy. In their disputations both frequently invoke the very same passages to support irreconcilable points of view. Yet Scripture must decide whose views are true. Agreement of some kind is therefore clearly necessary if an appeal to the Word is to be of any profit to the cause of either. Such agreement must take the form of a common resolve not to argue at cross-purposes; the one must on no account discuss the conceptions of the other in terms of his own. To do so merely creates misunderstanding and purposeless argument. This can be seen in their approach to Genesis 2: 17 .

A and B each interpret this verse differently. A says that it threatens execution on the day of transgression; B, that it threatens Adam that he should that day become subject to mortality ( i.e. , become a dying creature). When either attacks the other’s conception on the assumption that his own interpretation of this verse is correct, the arguments they employ are for the most part ineffective. Let us, for example, examine B’s objections to redemption by a substitute. For B such redemption implies logically: (1) that the Redeemer should have remained dead, and (2) that the redeemed should not die.

Observing next that the Redeemer rose from death, and that the redeemed still die as subjects of mortality, he concludes that substitution is proved untenable. But it is not so proved for A. The latter admits that to deny substitution is logical if one believes that Jesus was under condemnation of death, but insists that he himself entertains no such notion. He believes:

1. that in actual fact the Redeemer did forfeit all possession of life in a natural body (resuming existence afterwards in a spiritual body), and,

2. that the redeemed do not in fact die the death of Adamic condemnation (which is regarded as something entirely different from B’s conception of it as liability to death through the possession of a corruptible nature).

From this we see that, while B’s arguments are unanswerable by one who believes in both substitution and physical condemnation, they are lost on A who accepts substitution but repudiates physical condemnation. Thus, in employing this particular form of argument, B is in effect beating the air, labouring to destroy what A does not preach instead of what he does, in fact, affirm.

It follows that A and B must disprove the other’s premise first, then the deductions from it. An authoritative interpretation of Genesis 2: 17 is essential. This can only be obtained from the precise statements of Scripture on the consequences of Adam’s transgression.

The task to be accomplished in ensuing articles is therefore twofold, to prove that Adam’s sin was physical, as well as legal, in its effects, and to expose the erroneous character of other beliefs which the Nazarene premise implies. These beliefs can be summarized under three heads:

1. Man’s flesh is not constitutionally sinful.

2. Christ’s resurrection played no part in man’s redemption.

3. There exists a personal devil.

Of these propositions the first is prominently taught, the second is admitted, and the third is indignantly denied. They, together with the charges against our own faith, will be examined later. Meanwhile, an appeal to Scripture can no longer be delayed.